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I. INTRODUCTION
A major obstacle facing an attorney, whose client is suing a state in
federal court under a right created by a federal law, is the restraints
placed on the federal court's jurisdiction by the eleventh amendment to
the United States Constitution.' Often the attorney has no choice but to
pursue his remedy in federal court, because Congress has either given
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts, or there is not
an adequate state remedy available. The attorney, in this case, is entering
what one federal judge has characterized as "a wonderland of judicially
created and perpetuated fiction and paradox.' 2 The purpose of this article
is to provide assistance through this wonderland of eleventh amendment
jurisprudence.
Before beginning this journey, one must realize that, as in Wonderland,
things are not always as they seem. The eleventh amendment today is
an evolving doctrine. There are three basic issues on which the Supreme
Court is either very closely divided or has avoided addressing. The most
fundamental division is over whether the amendment prohibits a federal
court from hearing a case when a state is being sued on a federal question.
If one reads the amendment literally, it only prohibits a state from being
sued in federal court on diversity grounds ("by citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or subjects of any foreign state.").3 Yet, at the time the
amendment was enacted federal courts did not have jurisdiction over
federal question cases. 4 It was not until 1875 that Congress granted the
federal courts general federal question jurisdiction 5 and it was not until
1890, nearly one hundred years after the enactment of the amendment,
that the Court first addressed this issue. The Court, in Hans v. Louisiana,
6
held that the amendment barred a state from being sued by a citizen of
the state in federal court. Hans was based on the concept of state sov-
ereignty. According to Justice Bradley's majority opinion, states are sov-
ereign and cannot be sued without their consent. 7
' U.S. CONST. amend. X1 states: "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
subjects of any Foreign State."
2 Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1980) (cited in Lichtenstein,
Retroactive Relief in Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through
The Twilight Zone, 32 CASE W. REs. 364, 393 (1982)).
3U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73 (1789). The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 STAT.
132, 156 (1802) did grant general federal question jurisdiction to the federal circuit
courts, but that grant was repealed one year later. See Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
1 Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
6 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, sued the state to recover the
amount owed on certain bonds issued by the state. The Court held that the
eleventh amendment barred such suits.
7 Id. at 13.
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Since Hans, the Court has consistently held that the amendment pro-
tects a state from being sued in federal court under federal question
jurisdiction.8 The states' protection, however, under Hans is by no means
secure. Most of the recent cases have been five-four vote decisions. The
majority in these cases have continued to reaffirm Hans,9 but four of the
current justices believe that the premise in Hans was incorrect, that the
amendment was not intended to establish state sovereignty. 0 In Justice
Brennan's view, "[tihere simply is no constitutionally mandated policy of
excluding suits against States from federal court.""' The dissent would
interpret the amendment as only prohibiting a state from being sued in
federal court by a citizen or subject of another state or nation. Justice
Brennan points to new historical evidence which supports the finding
that the amendment was not intended to establish state sovereignty. 2
The Court's latest examination of Hans occurred during the last week
of the 1986-87 term, in Welch v. State Department of Highways and Public
Transportation.3 Welch was of particular interest in that it was the first
examination of Hans following the appointment of Justice Scalia. Oddly
enough, the petitioner in Welch did not assert, as a basis for reversing
the judgment, that Hans had been incorrectly decided. Justice Scalia
voted with the majority, but expressly reserved judgment on, Hans be-
cause the case presentation focused on other matters. 4
A closely related question, which the Court has not ruled on, is whether
the eleventh amendment prohibits Congress from enacting laws which
would give federal courts jurisdiction over states. If the eleventh amend-
ment was intended to grant states sovereign immunity, it would follow
that Congress could not abolish this immunity. So far the Court has
carefully avoided this question. 5
1 Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987);
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Dep't of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v.
Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47
(1944); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920).
9 The majority consists of retired Chief Justice Burger, retired Justice Powell,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and White. See Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S. 64 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
10 The minority consists of Justices Brennan, Blackman, Marshall, and Ste-
vens. See Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp. 107 S.Ct. 2941(1987); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
11 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). This has been a
longstanding view of Justice Brennan. See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 125 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Yeomans v.
Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 948 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees of the Dep't of Pub.
Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).11 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
13 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
14 Id. at 2958.
15 See infra note 76.
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The Court is sharply divided over what is the appropriate standard for
finding a waiver or abrogation of a state's eleventh amendment immunity.
Prior to 1974, the amendment received little attention because there were
several effective ways of avoiding its bar.16 However, beginning in 1974,
with the case of Edelman v. Jordan,7 the Court has gradually increased
the requirements for finding a waiver or abrogation of a state's immunity.
The Court's most recent decision on abrogation and waiver occurred in
1985, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.' The Court, in Atascadero,
held "that Congress may abrogate the states' constitutionally secured
immunity from suits in federal court only by making its intention un-
mistakably clear in the language of the statute."'19
This article examines all three of these issues, plus-and perhaps more
importantly-methods of avoiding eleventh amendment litigation. Sec-
tion One of the article examines the historical evidence on whether the
amendment was intended to apply to cases in which a citizen of a state
is suing a state for violating a federal law. 20 Section Two analyzes whether
the amendment was intended to limit congressional power to make states
subject to federal law. Section Three analyzes the requirements for finding
a waiver or abrogation of a state's eleventh amendment immunity. In
this part, a variety of federal statutes are examined to determine whether
they apply to the states under the Atascadero standard. This section also
explores possible ways of avoiding the high hurdle established by Atas-
cadero. Section Four analyzes methods of avoiding the eleventh amend-
ment bar. This section will explore such devices as suing a state official
rather than the state, or suing for equitable relief.
16 See infra text accompanying note 98-102.
17 415 U.S. 651 (1974). For a discussion of the facts in Edelman, see infra note
176.
18 473 U.S. 234 (1985). In Atascadero, the Court refused, under the eleventh
amendment, to allow a federal suit against a California state hospital brought
by a diabetic person who was denied employment, allegedly due to his hardship,
in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). The Court
stated: "As we have recognized, the significance of this Amendment 'lies in its
affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant
of judicial authority in Article III' of the Constitution." Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Hald-
erman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)). Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy dissent in Atascadero
that was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
19 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
20 The Supreme Court split over the eleventh amendment/state sovereignty
issue has provided fertile ground for eleventh amendment scholarship. See Amar,
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Swan, 11th Amendment
Revisited: Suits Against State Government Entities and Their Employees in Fed-
eral Court, 1987 J.C. & U.L. 1-57; Note, "Arm of the State" Analysis in Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence, 6 REv. Lb. 193-226 (1987); Note, Eleventh Amend-
ment: Kentucky v. Graham; 11th Amendment Fictions are Alive and Well, 1986
UMKC L. REV. 691-703 (1986); Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK.
L. REV. 447-98 (1986); Shoenfeld, The Applicability of Eleventh Amendment Im-
munity under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 163-91
(1986); Note, Death Knell for Judicially Protected State Sovereignty, 20 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 645-72 (1986); Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense about State Immunity, 2
CONST. COMMENTARY 93 (1986); Lehrer, Expanding the States' 11th Amendment
Immunity: A comment on Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 20 CLEARING
HOUSE REV. 2 (1986); Note, The Eleventh Amendment's Lengthening Shadow Over
(Vol. 37:3
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II. WAS THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT INTENDED TO ESTABLISH STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
The decision in Hans was based on the premise that, when the Consti-
tution was enacted, the Framers did not intend to extend federal court
jurisdiction to private claims against states.2 The Court reasoned that
the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,22 in which the Court held that the
federal courts had such jurisdiction, was in error. The Court concluded
that the eleventh amendment was intended to overturn Chisholm and
restore the state's sovereign immunity.2 3 Both of these premises must be
examined, because if either is true, states are immune from suit in federal
court.
A. Was Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution
Intended to Grant Federal Courts Jurisdiction over Private Causes
of Action Against a State?
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution grants the federal courts ju-
risdiction over two types of cases, identified either by subject matter or
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Hald-
erman, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 515-52 (1985); The Eleventh Amendment and State
Damage Liability Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 71 VA. L. REV. 655 (1985);
Comment, Confronting the Fictions of the Eleventh Amendment: Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 60 WASH. L. REV. 407 (1985); Shapiro, Wrong
Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61
(1984); Flecher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amend-
ment and State Sovereign Immunity; A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889
(1983); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: and Endangered Species, 55 IND.
L.J. 293 (1980); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION; TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF POWER 139-68 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129-43 (1978);
Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (1977);
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suits Upon the States,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Liberman, State Sovereign Immunity in Suits to
Enforce Federal Rights, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 195 (1977); Nowak, The Scope of
Congressional Power to Create Cause of Action Against State Government and the
History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1426
(1975); C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 15
(1972).
21 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
22 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Chisholm v. Georgia was an original action filed
in the Supreme Court, by Alexander Chisholm, the executor of the estate of Robert
Farquar. Georgia had not paid a debt owed to Farquar, a citizen of South Carolina,
for supplies he furnished to the state during the Revolutionary War. Georgia
refused to participate in the case claiming sovereign immunity. The primary
question before the court was whether article III, section 2, conferred jurisdiction
to the federal courts to hear cases when the state was being sued by a citizen of
another state. By a four to one vote, the Court held that it had jurisdiction and
entered a default judgment against Georgia. See infra text accompanying notes
60-65.
134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
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parties. The subject matter jurisdiction includes federal questions ("all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made."). 24 Party based jurisdiction is
grounded in diversity of citizenship. It encompasses three types of diver-
sity including ordinary diversity ("Controversies... between Citizens of
different States"), state-citizen diversity ("between a state and Citizens
of another State"), and state-alien diversity ("between a state ... and
foreign ... Citizens"). 25
The records of the Federal Convention offer little guidance as to
whether article III, section 2, was intended to apply to suits against states
based on private causes of action created by federal law. The following
facts are known. A proposal for a federal judiciary was part of a series of
sixteen resolutions introduced by Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1987.26
There is a considerable body of evidence that the proposal on the federaljudiciary was probably drafted by James Madison.2 7 Madison had earlier
expressed concern that a debtor state might act in favor of its citizens
and thus disturb the domestic tranquility and involve the nation in for-
eign contests. 28 The Randolph Resolution along with two others was re-
ferred to the Committee of Detail. The Committee report contained the
first reference to the federal judiciary having jurisdiction between a state
and citizens of another state.2 9 The debate centered on the method of
selecting and the tenure of federal judges. The question of federal juris-
diction appears to have received little attention.30 Motions dealing with
the federal tribunal were passed on June 13, 1787 and July 18, 1787, and
most of this action was by unanimous vote. 3 1
This was not the case at the state level. On the eve of the states'
ratification conventions, there was a great deal of concern about debts
the states had incurred during the Revolutionary War. While the Treaty
of Paris subjected the states to substantial liability to British creditors,
the collection of these debts was largely impossible under the Articles of
Confederation. The states were fearful that this would not be the case
under the proposed Constitution.32 This concern was not limited to just
?A U.S. CONST. art. III, 3 cl. 1.
251d.
26 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTrruTION 143 (1907).27 See generally C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMU-
NrrY 15 (1972).
23 Id. at 14.
2Id. at 17.
SO See generally F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM 25458 (1985); C. JA-COBS, supra note 28, at 16-27; Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws
of Nature, Sup. CT. REV., 49-83 (1982).
31 See 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 27, at 160, 174, 209, & 268-70.
22 The Treaty of Paris of 1783, 8 STAT. 80, between Britain and the UnitedStates, included a number of provisions that could subject the states to liability
to British creditors. Article V of the Treaty recognized completed State confis-
cations, or escheats, of British property. Article VI, however, prohibited escheats
that had not yet been completed. See generally Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUMN. L. REV. 1899,1899-1902, 1903-08 (1983). See also 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 27, at 529.
[Vol. 37:3
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the claims of British creditors. There was an equal concern about the
claim of United States creditors.3 3 While a number of states had made
substantial progress toward the payment of these debts, others had not.
Some states resorted to putting into circulation new paper money as a
painless way of meeting their obligations.
34
The question of whether article III, section 2, would give the federal
courts jurisdiction over states was debated in at least six state conventions
and at least four of these states considered amendments that would have
prohibited federal courts from hearing cases when a state was being sued
by a citizen of another state or nation.35 None of these amendments was
adopted.
36
It is by no means clear that the delegates to the ratification convention
enacted article III, section 2, on the assumption that states would be
immune from suit in federal court. Justice Bradley supported his position
in Hans by citing the position taken by Madison, 37 Hamilton38 and Mar-
shall.39 Yet, in none of these quotations was the question of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction addressed. All three expressly limited their remarks to
cases when a state was being sued by a citizen of another state. Madison
This concern was expressed by Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention:
I am convinced, and I see clearly, that this paper money must be dis-
charged, shilling for shilling. The honorable gentleman must see better
than I can, from his particular situation and judgment; but this has
certainly escaped his attention. The question arising on the clause
before you is, whether an act of the legislature of this state, for scaling
money, will be of sufficient validity to exonerate you from paying the
nominal value, when such a law, called ex post facto, and impairing
the obligation of contracts, is expressly interdicted by it. Your hands
are tied up by this clause, and you must pay shilling for shilling; and,
in the last section, there is a clause that prohibits the general legis-
lature from passing any ex post facto law; so that the hands of Congress
are tied up, as well as the hands of the state legislatures. This state
may be sued in the federal court for those enormous demands, andjudgment may be obtained, unless ex post facto laws be passed. To
benefit whom are we to run this risk? I have heard there were vast
quantities of that money deposited in the ... Northern States, and
whether in public or private hands makes no odds. They have acquired
it for the most in considerable trifle. If you accord to this part, you are
bound hand and foot. Judgment must be rendered against you for the
whole.
III J. ELLIOT, supra note 27, at 473, 475.
C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at 8.
31 Id. at 28.
36 Id. at 27.
37 James Madison addressed the issue of federal court jurisdiction at the Vir-
ginia Convention on the adoption of the Federal Constitution. He stated:
Its jurisdiction (the federal jurisdiction) in controversies between a
State and citizens of another State is much objected to, and perhaps
without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any State
into court. The only operation it can have, is that, if a State should
wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the
federal court. This will give satisfaction to individuals, as it will pre-
vent citizens, on whom a State may have a claim, being dissatisfied
with the state courts .... It appears to me that this (clause) can have
no operation but this - to give a citizen a right to be heard in the
1989]
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federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party this court
may take cognizance of it.
III J. ELLIOT, supra note 27, at 533.
31 Alexander Hamilton addressed the issue of federal court jurisdiction in The
Federalists No. 81.
Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of
this paper, I shall take occasion to mention here, a supposition which
has excited some alarm upon very mistaken ground. It has been sug-
gested that an assignment of the public securities of one state to the
citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute that state in federal
courts for the amount of those securities; A suggestion which the fol-
lowing considerations prove to be without foundation. It is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to suit of a individual
without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty,
is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the union. Unless,
therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention, it will remain with the states, and the danger intimated
must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are discussed ... in
considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A
recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us, that there
is no colour to pretend that the state governments, would by the adop-
tion of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts
in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from
the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and in-
dividuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have
no pretensions to the compulsive force. They confer no right of action,
independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to
authorize suits against states for the debts they owe? How could re-
coveries be enforced? It is evident, that it could not be done without
waging war against the contracting state; and to ascribe to the federal
courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting right
of the State governments, a power which would involve such conse-
quence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable.
J. COOKE, THE FEDERALISTS 548 (1961).
-John Marshall expressed a similar view in the Virginia debates on the rat-
ification of the Constitution.
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another
state, its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope
that no gentlemen will think that a state will be called at the bar of
the federal court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not many
cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state
is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should
be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover
claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this construc-
tion is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be a partiality
in it if a state cannot be defendant - if an individual cannot proceed
to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be sued by a state.
It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in
making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.
If this be only what cannot be avoided, why object to the system on
that account? If an individual has a just claim against any particular
state, is it to be presumed that, on application to its legislature, he
will not obtain satisfaction? But how could a state recover any claim
from a citizen of another state, without the establishment of these
tribunals?
III J. Elliot, supra note 27, at 555-56.
[Vol. 37:3
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appears on other occasions to have expressed a different opinion,40 and
Marshall subsequently interpreted the eleventh amendment not to pro-
hibit a state from being sued under federal question jurisdiction.
41
But, whatever the views of these three men, their views alone could
hardly be taken as expressing the intent of the thirty-nine delegates who
signed the Constitution. There was an equally strong view, particularly
that of the anti-Federalist, that this provision would subject the states
to just such suits. 42 George Mason,43 Patrick Henry44 and Edmund
Pendleton 45 all believed that the section would confer to the federal courts
jurisdiction over claims against the states. This view was not limited
to the anti-Federalist, Edmund Randolph, 46 who introduced article III,
section 2, to the Constitutional Convention, stating that he "admire[d]
that part which forces Virginia to pay her debts.."47 At least two of the
five members of the Committee of Detail who drafted the final version of
article III, section 2, believed that the section granted the federal courts
jurisdiction over the states.4 The failure to amend the section to comport
to the interpretation placed on it by Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall,
appears not to be just an oversight. In fact, one of the recommended
amendments at the New York Convention was to expressly address this
question. The amendment provided "nothing in the Constitution now
under consideration contained, is to be construed to authorize any suit
to be brought against any state, in any matter whatever."49 This and
similar amendments were not adopted.50
"o C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at 10-12.
41 Marshall's position on the eleventh amendment is unclear in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 6 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,410,412 ( ). The Court was considering the power
of review exercisable by the court over the judgments of a state court, wherein
it might be necessary to make the State itself a defendant in error. Marshall
writing for the majority stated: "[ilf the court were mistaken in this, its error did
not affect that case, because the writ of error therein was not prosecuted by 'a
citizen of another State' or 'of any foreign state'."
42 See generally Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of
Action Against State Government and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1975).
4III J. ELLIOT, supra note 27, at 533.
44Id. at 543.
4- Id. at 549.
4Id. at 573.
41 Id. at 207.
48 Members of the Committee of Detail were John Rutledge, Edmund Randolph,
Oliver Ellsworth, Nathaniel Gorham and James Wilson. In Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 Dall. 419 (1793) Edmund Randolph, the Attorney-General of the United States,
was counsel for the plaintiff and James Wilson was a Supreme Court Justice.
Both believed that article III, section 2 conferred jurisdiction to the federal courts
over claims against the states. There is also some evidence that Oliver Ellsworth
shared Randolph's and Wilson's view. See C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at 25.
49 II J. ELLIOT, supra note 27, at 409.
50 See generally Nowak, supra note 43, at 1427; C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at
1989]
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The interpretation in Hans is also at odds with the economic conditions
of the time. One of the primary motivations of the delegates to the Con-
stitutional Convention was to protect economic rights from the abuse of
state government.51 This was evidenced by the Constitutional grant of
congressional power over significant economic interests and limiting the
states' power to impair the right of contract. It would be highly unusual
for the Framers of the Constitution to establish these rights, but prohibit
the federal courts from enforcing them.
B. Was the Eleventh Amendment Intended to Apply
to Federal Question Cases?
The second premise in Hans was that the amendment was intended to
overturn Chisholm and to reinstate the original intent of article III, sec-
tion 2, that states were to be immune from private causes of action in
federal court. Unfortunately, the decision in Chisholm and the record of
the enactment of the eleventh amendment offer little guidance on whether
this conclusion is correct. The following facts are known.
The eleventh amendment was enacted as a result of the Court's holding
in Chisholm. The Court, in Chisholm, held that federal courts had juris-
diction under article III, section 2, to hear private claims against a state.
Chisholm drew an immediate reaction. On February 19, 1793, the day
after the decision was announced, Representative Theodore Sedwick in-
troduced the following Constitutional amendment:
That no state shall be liable to one made a party defendant, in
any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be estab-
lished under the authority of the United States, at the suit of
any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a for-
eigner or foreigners, or any body politic or corporate, whether
within or without the United States.52
The following day another amendment to the Constitution was proposed:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to
any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by
citizens or subjects of any foreign State. 3
51 See C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1925). The central premise of Beard's work was that large andimportant economic interest were adversely affected by the system of government
under the Articles of Confederation, particularly those of public creditors. The
constitutional convention was originated and spearheaded by this influential
group. But see F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE, THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1958); F. McDONALD, NORVUS ORDO SECLORUM (1985).
52 Pennsylvania Journal, Feb. 20, 1793. No mention is made of the Sedwick
Amendment in the House Journal or Annals of Congress. See also Nowak, supra
note 43, at 1436; but see 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 101 (1926).
53 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793).
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Both of these resolutions were tabled and no action was taken on them
during the remainder of the Second Congress. The Third Congress con-
vened in December of 1793. On January 2, 1794, the following resolution
was introduced to the Senate:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.54
This resolution, which is now the eleventh amendment, was passed by
the Senate by a vote of 23 to 2 on January 14, 1794. 55 The resolution was
passed by the House of Representatives on March 4, 1794, by a vote of
81 to 9. 56 While support for the eleventh amendment was overwhelming,
certification of the Action by the ratifying states was extremely erratic.
It was not until 1798 that Adams notified Congress that the requisite
twelve states had ratified the amendment.
57
The theory adopted in Hans, [hereinafter referred to as the tradition-
alists' theory], is that the primary reason the eleventh amendment was
enacted was to protect the states from paying debts incurred during the
Revolutionary War.58 Proponents of this view point to the fact that the
states were heavily indebted as a result of the Revolutionary War. Suits
to enforce these claims were the primary source of litigation facing the
pre-Marshall Court. Seven suits involving six jurisdictions were filed
prior to the ratification of the eleventh amendment.59 The states were
concerned, after the decision in Chisholm, that the dire prophecies made
by the anti-Federalist in the Virginia Convention were coming true.6 0 As
a result, the eleventh amendment was enacted to repudiate Chisholm
and to restore sovereign immunity. Proponents of this view point to the
wording of the eleventh amendment which states that: "The Judicial
power shall not be construed to extend to.. ." as proof that the amendment
was intended to have retroactive effect and bar the federal courts from
hearing cases which had already been filed against the states. The Su-
preme Court interpreted the amendment this way in Hollingsworth v.
Virginia61 and dismissed all the pending suits against the states.
Id. at 25 (1794).
5 Id. at 30 (1794).
Id. at 476-78 (1794).
See J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 260 (1896). See
also C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at 67.
5 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 99 (1926).
" Vanstophost v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791); Oswald v. New York,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1792); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793);
Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320 (1796); Vassall v. Massachusetts, Docket
of the Supreme Court, August Term, 1793, Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug.
6, 1793; Cutting v. South Carolina, Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 1796;
Moultrie v. Georgia, Docket of the Supreme Court, Feb. Term 1797.
1 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934) (the decision "created such
a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and
adopted.") See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 59.
6' 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 378 (1798).
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There is a substantial body of evidence that tends to support a different
conclusion. A second theory, [hereinafter referred to as the revisionists'
theory], holds that the eleventh amendment was not intended to abrogate
the states' liability for wartime debts, but simply to prohibit a state from
being sued in federal court by a citizen or subject of another state of
nation. The revisionists point to the fact that economic conditions of the
states had changed between 1787 and 1794.62 By 1794 the federal gov-
ernment had assumed over two-thirds of the state debts and the states
for the most part were willing and able to pay the remainder of these
debts.0
The revisionists' theory is supported by the limited wording of the
amendment. Chisholm was a broadside attack on the principle of sov-
ereign immunity.6 Four of the five justices held, in separate opinions,
that the principle of sovereign immunity did not exist under our consti-
tutional framework2 If the intent of the eleventh amendment was to
restore sovereign immunity, one would assume that after the attack on
state sovereignty in Chisholm, Congress would have adopted an amend-
ment, such as that proposed by Representative Sedwick, which would
have clearly accomplished this objective. 66 Yet instead, Congress chose a
much more narrowly worded amendment that does not mention state
sovereignty.
The traditionalists' view also does not adequately explain the wide-
spread support which the eleventh amendment received from the Fed-
eralists. Professor Nowak points out that when Chisholm was announced,
it received largely favorable response from the Federalists' press,6 7 but
only one member of the Federalist party in each House voted against the
amendment.68 Why would the Federalists, who favored a strong central
62 See C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at 69.
m Id.
612 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793). Chief Justice Jay stated:
It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe,
and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles .... No suchideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the
people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are
sovereigns without subjects ... and have none to govern but them-
selves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint
tenants in the sovereignty. From the differences existing between feu-
dal sovereignties and Governments founded on compacts, it necessarily
follows that their respective prerogative must differ. Sovereignty is the
right to govern; a nation or State-sovereign is the person or persons
in whom that resides. In Europe the sovereignty is generally ascribed
to the Prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually
administers the Government; here, never in a single instance; our
Governors are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same
relation to their sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their
sovereigns.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793).
See supra text accompanying note 53.67 Nowak, supra note 43, at 1435.
6 The Senate passed the eleventh amendment by a vote of 23 to 2. The yea
votes were Federalists 7, Democratic-Republicans 6, No party 9, Law & Order 1.
The nay votes were Federalist 1, Democratic-Republicans 1. The House of Rep-
resentatives passed the eleventh amendment by a vote of 81 to 9. The yea votes
were Federalists 21, Democratic-Republicans 22, Antifederalists 1, No Party 37.
The nay votes were Federalists 1, Democratic-Repubicans 2, No. Party 4. See 3
ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793).
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government and the payment of these debts, support the amendment?
The traditionalists' view is that the amendment was supported by both
parties because it simply reaffirmed the common understanding of article
III, section 2, that the states could not be sued in federal court.6 9
A more plausible explanation is that the Federalists' support was a
product of the political climate of the times. In 1794, the central political
issue in the United States was the possibility of war with Great Britain.
7 0
The narrowly worded amendment would allow the Federalists to prevent
Tories and British creditors from suing the states in federal court, but
still allow Congress to control court jurisdiction in federal question cases.
While no direct proof exists that the Federalists voted for the amendment
for this reason, a convincing argument can be made that this accounted
for the very limited nature of the wording and the Federalist support.
III. WAS THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT INTENDED TO LIMIT
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO GRANT FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION
OVER THE STATES?
A closely related question is whether the eleventh amendment prohibits
Congress from granting federal courts jurisdiction over the states. So far,
the Supreme Court has carefully avoided this question. In Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,7 the Court recognized Congressional power to abrogate a state's
eleventh amendment immunity under the enforcement provision of the
fourteenth amendment.72 Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion in
Fitzpatrick, distinguished the powers of Congress under the fourteenth
amendment from those granted under article I.73 Justice Rehnquist relied
on the fact that section five of the fourteenth amendment expressly grants
Congress power over the states.7 4 Fitzpatrick could be interpreted to stand
69 See WARREN, supra note 59, at 96.
70 The vote in the Senate occurred just one month after the British announced
that they had signed a treaty with the Algerian pirates which would allow the
pirates to continue activities in the Atlantic. The House vote occurred just one
week after word reached Congress that Great Britain had ordered the seizure of
American vessels trading with the French islands in the West Indies. The Fed-
eralists responded to the increased tension by introducing in Congress a series
of measures to improve the nation's military capacity. James Madison, a Dem-
ocratic-Republican, accused the formerly pro-British Federalist of doing this only
to gain the support of the people. Nowak, supra note 43, at 1438.
71 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The eleventh amendment does not prohibit states from
being sued under the 1972 amendments of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, provides that: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
13 U.S. CONST. Article I, § 8.
14 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Justice Rehnquist stated in the majority opinion:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative
authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant,
it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional
Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limita-
tions on state authority. We think that Congress may, in determining
what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts.
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simply as an application of the general rule of construction; that if two
legal instruments of equal authority conflict, the more recent enacted
prevails. At this time, the Court has not recognized this power under
other sections of the Constitution and has, on at least one occasion,
avoided the issue by addressing the abrogation question under the four-
teenth amendment rather than the commerce clause.75 Welch v. State
Department of Highways and Public Transportation76 was the Court's
most recent examination of the abrogation question. In Welch, the Court
expressly reserved judgment on whether Congress can abrogate a state's
eleventh amendment immunity under other sections of the Constitution.17
The Court is likely to soon decide what limits the eleventh amendment
places on Congressional action. Ataseadero has already led to the amend-
ment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)7M and several federal civil rights
acts79 which expressly make states subject to suits in federal courts. Sim-
ilar action is likely to take place with the copyright law80 and in other
areas of federal law which will be based on article I powers. The issue of
the limitations the eleventh amendment places on Congress will be raised
by the states and its importance is such that it is likely to be addressed
by the Court.
A. The Impact of Hans v. Louisiana on Congressional Abrogation
If the Court is to find that Congress has power to abrogate the states'
eleventh amendment immunity, it must either distinguish or overturn
Hans. Hans appears to be a very broad endorsement of state sovereignty.
The Court's language is explicit and clear that: "[i]t is inherent in the
nature of a sovereignty not to be amenable to the suits of individuals
without (the sovereign's) consent. This ... attribute of sovereignty ... is
... enjoyed by the government of every state of the Union."' If this is
76 See Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.445, 459 (1976), in which he states that Congress has power under the commercepower clause to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. Justice Ste-
vens believed that the Court should have addressed the question of whetherCongress has power to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity in
cases involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)
under the commerce clause rather than the fourteenth amendment.
76 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
17 Justice Powell writing for the majority stated: "We assume, without deciding
or intimating a view of the question, that the authority of Congress to subject
unconsenting States to suit in federal court is not confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 2946.
" See infra note 93.79 See infra note 84.
1 See infra note 118.
"1 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1889) (quoting The Federalists No. 81 (A. Hamilton)). See
also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) ("itsgreater significance [eleventh amendment] lies in its affirmation that the fun-damental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant ofjudicial authority.").
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the case, Congress could not statutorily change this result. It is likely,
however, that Justice Bradley was only speaking of judicial assumption
of power and not Congressional power to extend federal court jurisdiction
to the states. In his opinion, Justice Bradley cited with approval Justice
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm. Justice Iredell's dissent was based on the
premise that the Constitution only extended federal jurisdiction to cases
in which jurisdiction had either been conferred on it by Congress, or those
which were recognizable at common law. 82 This fact was recognized by
Justice Bradley and the language in the opinion appears to limit the
holding to a judicial assumption of power.83
The facts in Hans also support a narrow interpretation. Hans sued the
state of Louisiana under the contract clause of the United States
Constitution" for defaulting on bonds issued by the state. Since the con-
tract clause expressly applies to the states ("No State shall (enact) any
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts"), holding that the elev-
enth amendment limited Congressional action would in effect make the
contract clause meaningless in that the federal government could not
provide a mechanism for its enforcement. The question of Congressional
power to abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity was not before
the Court in Hans and was not addressed by it.
82 Justice Iredell was the only dissenting vote in Chisholm. He did not accept
Attorney General Randolph's view: "That the moment a supreme court is formed,
it is to exercise all the judicial power vested in it by the constitution, by its own
authority, whether the legislature has prescribed methods of doing so, or not." 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431 (1793). Since Congress had not conferred jurisdiction with
the Court to hear an action in assumpsit, and since an action is assumpsit would
not lie against the sovereign at common law, Justice Iredell concluded that the
Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction over this type of case. Since the
question of congressional power to confer jurisdiction to federal courts was not
addressed, this matter was not discussed by Justice Iredell. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,
434 (1793).
419, 434 (1793).
8 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890). Justice Iredell, on the contrary,
contended that:
It was not the intention to create new and unheard of remedies, by
subjecting sovereign States to actions as the suit of individuals (which
he conclusively showed was never done before,) but only, by proper
legislation, to invest the federal courts with jurisdiction to hear and
determine controversies and cases, between the parties designated,
that were properly susceptible of litigation in courts. (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
1989]
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
B. The Relationship Between the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
on Congressional Abrogation
Another factor entering in this equation is the relationship between
the tenth and eleventh amendments. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority85 the Court held that Congress, in exercising
its powers under the commerce clause, could constitutionally apply the
minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act (FLSA)86 to employees of the state. The Court interpreted the
state's protection under the tenth amendment as being one of process.
Justice Blackmun in writing for the majority stated:
[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to pro-
tect the "States as States" is one of process rather than one of
result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce
Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural na-
ture of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to com-
pensate for possible failings in the national political process
rather than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy."8
Just four months after Garcia, the Court in Atascadero reaffirmed Hans
and held that the eleventh amendment prohibits a state from being suedin federal court. These cases are difficult to reconcile. Both cases were
five-four decisions, with only Justice White voting both times with the
majority. One interpretation is that Congress may enact laws to apply to
the states, but may not give the federal courts jurisdiction to enforce theselaws. Such an interpretation lacks merit. Both Garcia and Atascadero
are based on the principle of state sovereignty. Inasmuch as state sov-
ereignty is not mentioned in the Constitution, if it exists, it must be
implied either from the intent of the Framers of the Constitution or from
subsequent amendments. If it exists under one amendment, it would
logically appear to exist under both. If the chief protection that the states
receive is one of process under the tenth amendment, that would logically
469 U.S. 528 (1985). In a period of less than twenty years the Court hastwice reversed itself on whether state sovereignty restricts Congress in exercisingits powers under the commerce clause. All three cases involved the same issue:
whether Congress could constitutionally apply the minimum wage and overtimepay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees of state.In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), the Court held that Congress could
constitutionally apply FLSA to the states. Wirtz was reversed eight years laterin National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in which the Courtheld that the state's sovereign immunity under the tenth amendment prohibited
the extension of FLSA to employees of the state fulfilling traditional governmentalfunctions. Garcia reversed Usery and declared unworkable the governmental-
propriety distinction adopted in that case.
- 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1982).87 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
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be the case under the eleventh amendment. While Garcia was not based
on the eleventh amendment, it would be totally inconsistent to say that
Congress, under its article I powers, can make the states subject to federal
laws, but cannot authorize the federal courts to enforce these laws. A
more rational explanation would be the one reached by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public
Transportation. The Court reconciled the holdings in Garcia and Atas-
cadero by adopting the position that Congress may abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity under the commerce clause, but it must expressly
do so under the eleventh amendment.-
So far, all six of the United States courts of appeals that have considered
this question have held that the eleventh amendment does not prohibit
Congress from granting the federal courts jurisdiction over the states
under its article I powers.8 9
IV. ABROGATION AND WAIVER OF A STATE'S ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
Federal courts have jurisdiction over a state if the state has either
waived its immunity or Cohgress has abrogated its immunity under the
fourteenth amendment.90 A waiver is a voluntary action on the part of
the state. A state may waive its immunity through state statute,
91 by
either voluntarily participating or voluntary participation in a federally
funded program which requires consent to suit in federal court as a con-
- 780 F.2d 1268, 1272 (1986), affd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
See also Field, Garcia v. San Antonion Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise
of Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1985).
89 W.J.M. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1988);
County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1128-35 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1104 (1983); United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986);
In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083
(1987); Peel v. Florida, 600 F.2d 1070, 1074-82 (5th Cir. 1979); Mill Music v.
Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979).
90 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
91 The Court has established a very stringent requirement for finding a waiver
of its eleventh amendment immunity through a state statute or state constitution.
In Atascadero, the Court held that article II, section 5 of the California Consti-
tution, which provides: "Suits may be brought against the State in such manner
and in such courts as shall be directed by law," was insufficient to waive eleventh
amendment immunity. The Court held that "in order for a state statute or con-
stitutional provision to constitute a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity, it
must specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." Id. at
241: see also Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S.
147, 150 (1981) ("Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity may
subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed
by the Eleventh Amendment"); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) ("[a] State's constitutional interest in immunity encom-
passes not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.").
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dition to participation,92 or by participating in a lawsuit.93
There has been a gradual tightening of the requirements for finding a
waiver of a state's eleventh amendment immunity. In the 1960's, the
Court used the concept of constructive consent to allow federal courts to
hear some federal questions cases against the states. The lead case was
Parden v. Terminal Railway Co.9 4 The Court held, in Parden, that an
employee of a state-owned railroad could sue the state in federal court
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) even though state-
owned railroads were not expressly mentioned in the statute. The swing
away from the constructive consent doctrine began in 1973, in Employees
v. Missouri Public Health Department25 The Court held, in Employees,
that Congress must make its intention "clear" if it sought to make a
waiver of the states' sovereign immunity a condition of participation in
a federal program. Employees was followed the next term by Edelman v.
Jordan.96 In Edelman, the Court set a still higher requirement for finding
92 Atascadero held that section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act which provided
remedies "to any person aggrieved by any act of failure to act by recipient ofFederal assistance of federal provider of such assistance" was insufficient to con-
stitute a waiver as a condition of participating in a federal funded program. See
supra, note 22, at 246. See also Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing HomeAss'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981), which held that an agreement under the MedicaidAct (42 USC § 1396) in which the department "agrees to recognize and abide by
all State and Federal Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines..." was insufficient to
constitute a waiver. See generally infra text accompanying notes 94-98.93 In Atascadero, the Court required "an unequivocal indication that the Stateintends to consent to federal jurisdiction" before finding a waiver of its eleventh
amendment immunity. 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Barnes v. Bosley, 625 F. Supp.81, 86 (1985) ("The State's neglect in asserting the eleventh amendment does not
constitute an unequivocal indication of its consent to suit."); Ford Motor Co. v.Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1944) (eleventh amendment may be raisedfor the first time in the Supreme Court). Since a federal court can enjoin future
violation of federal law (Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985)), action by a state
official which delays prospective injunctive relief will constitute a waiver. SeeToll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1981) (a state university waived the eleventh amend-
ment immunity by promising that if the trial court stayed its order pending
appeal, it would make appropriate refunds of tuition if it lost the appeal); Vargas
v. Tranor, 508 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1974) (a state official's promise, that the state
would pay benefits wrongfully withheld if the court would not issue an injunctionpending appeal, was sufficient to constitute a waiver of the eleventh amendment);Barnes v. Bosley, 625 F. Supp. 81 (1985) (the state waived a portion of its eleventh
amendment immunity by filing an answer in a wrongful discharge action seeking
reinstatement and back pay.); W.J.M. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare,840 F.2d 996 (1st. Cir. 1988) (the state waived its eleventh amendment immunityby filing a bankruptcy proof of claim). The state only waives its immunity forprospective benefits. See Buckhanon v. Percy, 708 F.2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir. 1983)(payment of state benefits prior to court's order retroactive); Nevels v. Hanlon,656 F.2d 372, 377 (8th Cir. 1981) (payment of benefits from date of order allowed);Kimble v. Solomon, 599 F.2d 599,605 (4th Cir. 1979) (state required to pay benefits
after court's decree entered on remand); Townsend v. Edelman, 518 F.2d 116, 120(7th Cir. 1975) (payment prior to entry of injunctive relief barred).
377 U.S. 184 (1964) (a "common carrier by railroad..." was held to include
state owned railroads.) Parden was overturned by Welch. See infra text accom-
panying note 99.
D5 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973)
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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a waiver by stating that "we will find waiver only where stated by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the
text as [will) leave no room for any other reasonable construction. '97 Welch
v. State Department of Highways and Public Transportation98 is the latest
case in which the Court considered a state's waiver of its eleventh amend-
ment immunity. In Welch, the Court affirmed the standard set forth in
Edelman and overturned the concept of constructive consent.
Abrogation is distinguishable from waiver in that abrogation is based
upon congressional power and not upon state consent. The Court has also
tightened the standards for finding an abrogation of a state's eleventh
amendment immunity. In 1984, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman,99 the Court required "an unequivocal expression of congres-
sional intent" to find an abrogation. Pennhurst was followed one year
later by Atascadero and the adoption of the "unmistakably clear language
of the statute" requirement. 100
A. The Impact of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon on
Federal Court Jurisdiction
This section examines the cases in which federal courts have applied
the Atascadero standard. This examination will be followed by an analysis
of means of avoiding Atascadero.
1. Protection of Intellectual Property
The eleventh amendment would appear to protect the states from being
sued as an infringer under the Patent Act,
10 1 the Copyright Act of 1976,102
and the Lanham Act (Trade-Marks Act). 10 Each of these Acts uses very
broad language to describe the group to whom the statute applies. The
Patent Act provides that, "[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer."0 4 The Lanham Act defines an
infringer as being "[any person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant.. ,,"o5 The Copyright Act of 1976 uses equally broad language.
The Act defines an infringer as "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner .. .,o6 None of these Acts appears to meet
the standards set forth in Atascadero.
97 Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
98 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)).
1- 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
101 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982).
102 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
103 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1958).
104 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982).
105 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1958).
106 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
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Eleventh amendment litigation of intellectual property rights has cen-
tered on the Copyright Act of 1976. Yet even here, case law on this
question is quite sparse. Prior to Atascadero, only two federal courts had
addressed a state's eleventh amendment immunity under the 1976 Act. 0 7
In Mills Music v. Arizona,108 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed
the Act's application to "any person" as being sufficiently explicit to in-
clude a state. In Johnson v. University of Virginia,1 9 the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Virginia adopted the Mills Music inter-
pretation and held that a state university was not immune from suit for
a copyright violation.
This question has been addressed by three federal district courts after
Atascadero. All three held that under the new standard "any person"
would not include states. 10 In one of these cases, Woelfter v. Happy States
of America,"' the court also held that the eleventh amendment prohibited
a state from being sued under the Lanham Act. Recently, the Copyright
Office sought public comment on the issue, and is preparing a "green
paper" on the assessment of any constitutional limitation with respect to
congressional action. 1 2
2. Civil Rights Cases
The area of the law receiving the greatest amount of attention since
Atascadero has been the states' liability under federal civil rights acts.
As mandated by Atascadero, the states' liability for violation of a civil
rights statute is dependent on the language used in the statute. The civil
rights acts of the Reconstruction Era use very broad language in iden-
tifying defendants. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code13
identifies potential defendants as: "Every Person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.
... In Quern v. Jordan,"5 the Court held that Congress in enacting
section 1983 did not intend to abrogate a state's eleventh amendment
" Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962) held that the Copyright Act of
1909 did not waive eleventh amendment immunity.108 591 F.2d 1278, 1286 (9th Cir. 1979).
109 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985). See Richard Anderson Photography v.
Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986) which held that Johnson v.University of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985) would have been decided
differently after Atascadero.
11 B.V. Engineering v. University of Cal., 657 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp 1154 (W.D. Va.
1986); Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., 626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (dec-
laratory judgment on state of campaign. Congress had not abrogated a state's
eleventh amendment immunity under the Copyright of Lanham Acts).
"' 626 F. Supp. 499, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
11 35 Pat. Trademark to Copyrights (BNA) 536-37 (Nov. 1987).
113 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) (Section 1983 is derived from the Civil Rights Act
of 1871).
114 Id.
115 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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immunity.11 6 Quern was decided prior to Atascadero and was based upon
the statute's legislative history rather than the actual wording of the
statute."7 Atascadero strengthens the holding in Quern, but Section 1983
continues to be a major source of litigation against the states.11 s
Prior to Atascadero, the question of whether the eleventh amendment
granted the states immunity from suit under section 1981 of Title 42 of
the United States Code"1 9 was very much undecided. 120 Section 1981 pro-
vides that, "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right ... to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens . ". . .,,2 A literal reading of the section identifies the class of
plaintiffs protected by the statute - those denied the rights of white
citizens - but it does not identify or grant immunity to any particular
groups of defendants.122 While there is some evidence that Congress in-
tended Section 1981 to apply to the states, 123 the few courts that addressed
this question prior to Atascadero held that the eleventh amendment
granted the states immunity.124 Atascadero makes states' eleventh
amendment immunity defense even stronger in that section 1981 does
not make Congress' intent "unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute" 5 as required by Atascadero.1
26
11 Quern did not decide whether Congress in adopting section 1983 intended
the term "person" to include states for purposes of section 1983 actions in state
court. See Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 428 Mich. 561, 566, 410 N.W.2d
749, 757 (1987) (suit by former resident of training school against state and public
official for false imprisonment due to improper commitment to institution for
retarded, breach of duty of care and violation of the state and federal constitution.
Held neither a state nor state official sued in official capacity is a person for
purposes of a section 1983 damage suit.) If a state is not a person within the
meaning of section 1983, it would appear that states could not waive their im-
munity. But, several recent cases hold that a state may waive its section 1983
immunity. See Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 636 F.Supp. 64, 70 (M.D.
Ala. 1986) (eleventh amendment barred enforcement of settlement agreement
against state of Alabama in case challenging state's teacher certification test as
racially discriminatory, in the absence of finding of violation of federal consti-
tutional or statutory law, and in the absence of clear and unequivocal consent by
state to waive its eleventh amendment immunity); Syre v. Comm'r, 662 F. Supp.
550 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (state had not waived its immunity under the Pennsylvania
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.); Minotti v. Lensink, 798
F.2d 607 (2d. Cir. 1986) (state had not waived it eleventh amendment immunity
under section 1983.); Gamble v. Florida Dep't. of Health, 779 F.2d 1509 (eleventh
Cir. 1986) (Florida has not waived its immunity to section 1983 suits.); Barnes
v. Bolsley, 625 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri waived its eleventh amend-
ment immunity to a portion of the claims by filing answer to a wrongful discharge
action seeking reinstatement and back pay filed by deputy clerk of the St. Louis
Circuit Court); Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1986) (state is a
person within section 1983 such that where it has voluntarily waived its eleventh
amendment immunity in federal courts it may be held liable in the same respect
as municipal and local governments).
17 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 would not support the finding that the Act was
intended to apply to the states. He stated:
But neither logic, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor the legislative history of the 1871 Act
compel, or even warrant, a leap from this proposition to the conclusion
that Congress intended by the general language of the Act to overturn
the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.
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Id. at 342. Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment but expressed the
view that a state was a person within the meaning of section 1983. Brennan
stated:
The plain words of§ 1983, its legislative history and historical context,
all evidence that Congress intended States to be embraced within its
remedial cause of action. The Court today pronounces its conclusion
in dicta by avoiding such evidence. It chooses to hear, in the eloquent
and pointed legislative history of § 1983, only 'silence'.
Id. at 350.
"I S-1 By And Through P-1 v. Turlington, 464 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (class action against Florida officials and agencies alleging misclassification
on race in special education program for educable mentally retarded students.
Congress did not intend to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity
by enacting section 1983.); La Courte Oreilles Chippeewa Ind. v. Wisconsin, 663
F. Supp. 682, 691 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (Wisconsin not a person under section 1983);
Richardson v. Penfold, 650 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (inmate suit under section
1983 against prison officials for failure to protect him from sexual assaults by
other inmates barred by the eleventh amendment); Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d
874 (6th Cir. 1986) (bailiffs' action alleging that State of Michigan deprived them
of property interest in their positions without due process or just compensation
barred by the l1th amendment); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir.
1986) (section 1983 action by patient at state mental institution for injuries
sustained barred by the eleventh amendment); Clift by Clift v. Fincannon, 657
F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (section 1983 action against the state for the
wrongful death of a child in the custody of the Texas Dep't of Mental Health and
Retardation barred by the eleventh amendment); Holman v. Walls, 648 F. Supp.
947 (D. Del. 1986) (action by municipal police officer for indemnity from state
when he was being sued under section 1983 was barred by the eleventh amend-
ment); Keenan v. Washington Metro Area Transit Auth., 643 F. Supp. 324 (D.C.
1986) (section 1983 suit against metro transit police officer for assault and battery,
false imprisonment, and negligent hiring barred by the eleventh amendment);
Doyle v. Dukakis, 643 F. Supp. 1441 (D. Mass. 1986) (governor cannot be sued
as a state official pursuant to section 1983); Shaw v. California Dep't of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1986) (suit for improper revocation of
liquor licence barred by the eleventh amendment); Mazanec v. North Judson-San
Pierre School, 614 F. Supp. 1152 (D.C. Ind. 1985) (section 1983 action arising
from enforcement of Indiana compulsory school attendance law was barred by
the eleventh amendment); Miller v. Rutgers Univ., 619 F. Supp. 1386 (D.C.N.J.
1985) (eleventh amendment barred false arrest claim against state university
police officer).
19 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (section 1981 is derived from the Civil Rights Act
of 1870).
120 See 1 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL PRACTICE 53 (1980).
j2j 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
122 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (the Court has held that
private citizens are proper defendants in a section 1981 action, and that the
plaintiff need not establish either "state action" or "color of law" to prevail).
Section 1981 has its origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The section was enacted
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment. As a result "private citizens are proper
defendants in suits brought under this section." See, 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note
121, at 52.
123 Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Center, 623 F. Supp. 19 (D.C. N.Y. 1985).
124 Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 424 F.Supp. 1242 (N.D. Miss.
1976); Hirych v. State, 376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910 (1965); but see Hall v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978).
121 437 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
126 Courts interpreting section 1981 since Atascadero have uniformly held that
states are immune from suit under the eleventh amendment. See Freeman v.
Michigan Dep't of State, 808 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1987); Malone v. Schenk, 638 F.
Supp. 423 (C.D. Ill 1985) (§ 1981 action for discrimination in refusing to sell a
state lottery ticket barred by the eleventh amendment); Davis v. Buffalo Psy-
chiatric Center, 623 F. Supp. 19 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (employment discrimination
action brought against a state agency under section 1981 barred by the eleventh
amendment).
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States are clearly not immune from suit under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972127
amended Title VII to include "governments, governmental agencies, [and]
political subdivisions. '128 The Court, in Fitzpatrick,129 held that Congress
had expressly abrogated the states' eleventh amendment immunity in
Title VII cases. While no case has addressed this question since Atas-
cadero, it would appear that Atascadero would not change this result.
The states' eleventh amendment immunity is much less clear under
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 [hereinafter section
1988.1 30 Section 1988 provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title (title 42), title
IX of Public Law 92-318 (popularly known as the Education
Amendments of 1972), or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.' 3'
In Hutto v. Finney,'3 2 the Court held Congress, in enacting Section 1988,
intended to override the states' eleventh amendment immunity. The
Court found that "[t]he legislative history [was]... plain .... [Congress]
intended that attorney's fees [would] be collected... from the state .... ,133
Whether Hutto is still good law is in question in that Hutto was based
on the legislative history of Section 1988,'13 and states are not identified
in "the language of the statute" as required by Atascadero.135 In Kelly v.
Metro County Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
in a split decision that Atascadero did not bar a state from being sued
under Section 1988.136
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. IV 1970).
128 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (Supp. IV 1970). The 1964 Act was amended by § 2(1)
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to include "governments,
governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions."
19 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976) (cited in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)).
Congress authorized the state to be sued. The statute made explicit reference to
the availability of a private action against state and local governments in the
event that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Attorney Gen-
eral failed to bring suit.
10 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
131 Id.
132 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'q denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
1
3 3 Id. at 694 (quoted in In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 326 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1987)).
134Id.
'3 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1988).
'3 773 F.2d 677, 687 (6th Cir. 1985) (award of attorney's fees under the Civil
Rights Attorney Fees Act (42 U.S.C. § 1988) not barred by the 11th amendment.
Judge Kennedy dissented on the grounds that the 11th amendment barred suit
awards). See also In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 326 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1987) (dictum in the decision indicates that Atascadero
was not intended to overturn Hutto).
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3. Federal Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination by
Recipients of Federal Assistance
One of the major sources of eleventh amendment litigation since Atas-
cadero has concerned federally assisted programs designed to prevent
various forms of discrimination. Courts have applied Atascadero to these
cases even though, arguably, the less demanding waiver standard should
be applied since jurisdiction is predicated on participation in federally
assisted programs. The United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 3 7
has interpreted the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) -which
provides in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall deny equal educational
opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or
national origin.. ."138-as meeting the Atascadero standard. States have
been held to be immune from suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,139 which provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person.., shall on
the ground of race, color, or national origin be denied the benefits of...
any program ... receiving federal financial assistance.' ' 1 There is a
splitl4l as to whether states are immune from suit under the Education
of the Handicapped Act (EHC).142 While the EHC does not expressly
mention states, two courts have held that the Atascadero standard has
been met by the preamble to the Act.143 The Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975 allows suit in federal court by "[any party
aggrieved."'1" The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have held that states are immune from suit under this
provision. 45 The Court in Atascadero held that the Rehabilitation Act of
13 811 F.2d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1987).
38 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1982).
1"9 United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that state
employees, but not the state may be enjoined from violating Title VI); Gomez v.
Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1987) (state immune from suit
under Title VI for not testing students for English proficiency and not providing
for bilingual instruction or compensatory instruction). But see Parents For Quality
Education v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 662 F.Supp. 1475 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(decided after the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 infra note 141, holding that
states are not immune in school segregation cases under Title VI).
140 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1982).
141 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
42 20 U.S.C. §§ 602-61 (1982).
43 David D. v. Darmouth School Community, 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1780 (1986) (Congress abrogated the states' eleventh amend-
ment immunity under the Education for the Handicapped Act); Antkowiak v.
Ambash, 653 F. Supp. 1405 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (handicapped child and her father
brought action against Commissioner of N.Y. Educ. Dep't to require Dep't to pay
for placement at private residential and educational facility in Pennsylvania.
Education for the Handicapped Act abrogated the state's eleventh amendment
immunity); but see Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 817 F.2d
551 (9th Cir. 1987) (suit against San Francisco & Cal. Dep't of Educ. for denying
a severely handicapped autistic student an educational opportunity under the
Education of the Handicapped Act barred by the eleventh amendment).
144 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982).
145 Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d. 1470, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986); Gary A. v. New Trier
High School Dist. No. 203, 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986); but see John H. v. Brunelle,
631 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.H. 1986) (the eleventh amendment does not prohibit the
state from being sued under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act).
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1973,'146 which allows for suit against "any recipient of federal assistance,"
is too general to constitute congressional abrogation of eleventh amend-
ment immunity. Post-Atascadero cases have consistently applied this
standard. 
147
Congress, as a result of Atascadero, recently enacted Public Law 99-
506.148 This statute, which became effective on October 21, 1986, abro-
gates a state's eleventh amendment immunity for violating the Age Dis-
crimination Act of 1975, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section
794 of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (prohibiting dis-
crimination based on sex or blindness), and "[flederal statutes prohibiting
discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance". 49 Oddly
enough, Public Law 99-506 does not include the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Award Act within its coverage. A state's liability under the Act is
still an unanswered question.
4. Environmental Law
State liability under various environmental laws was clouded by Atas-
cadero. In United States v. Union Gas Co.,150 the United States Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that states were immune from suit under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA or Superfund).' 5 ' CERCLA allows those who have incurred
clean-up costs to sue "any person" who owned or operated the waste site
for all costs incurred. 15 2 Although the Act's definition of "person" included
states, the court held that the general definition was not sufficient to
abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity.153 The court distin-
guished CERCLA from the Clean Air Act,56 the Resource Conservation
16 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
"I Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc., v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th
Cir. 1987) (suit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 challenging decision not to
provide sign-language interpreter to enable deaf individuals to serve as jurors
barred by the eleventh amendment); Sanders v. Washington Metro Area Transit
Auth., 652 F. Supp. 765 (D.D.C. 1986) (suit under Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to
challenge compulsory drug tests and discharge based on test results was barred
by the eleventh amendment); Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)
(state immune from suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973);
Sullivan v. University of Miss. Med. Center, 617 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. Miss. 1985)
(suit against state employee under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was barred by
the eleventh amendment).
148 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (Supp. 1987).
149 Id.
150 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986) (the eleventh amendment barred gas company
from seeking to recover clean-up costs from the state; the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation Liability Act did not evidence any congres-
sional attempt to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity of the states).
,, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982).
1!42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982).
153 United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d at 379.
18442 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
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and Recovery Act, 155 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.156 The
court reasoned that unlike CERCLA, these acts allowed states to be sued
"to the extent allowed by the Eleventh Amendment."15 Congress recently
amended CERCLA to allow private suits against the states.158
5. Bankruptcy, Securities, et al.
Atascadero has had a significant impact on several other areas of the
law. In Welch, the Supreme Court held that Congress had not abrogated
the state's eleventh amendment immunity under either the Jones Act 1 9
or the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA).160 FELA applied to "every
common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of
the several States. 161 While the Jones Act covered "[a]ny seaman who
shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment."'162 Neither
of these statutes met the requirements of Atascadero.
In Charter Oak Federal Savings Bank v. Ohio,163 the State of Ohio was
sued under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'4 A 1975 amendment
to the Act expanded the definition of "person" to include "government.' ' 65
The court held that this term was not sufficiently definite to include states
under the Atascadero standard.16 6 In Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch v.
SIDA, 67 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held states immune from
suit under section one of the Sherman Act.168 However, in In re McVey
Trucking Inc. ,169 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the term
"governmental units" in the Bankruptcy Code included states.
155 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982).
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1985).
792 F.2d at 381.
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1987).
155 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
11Id.
1r62 46 U.S.C. § 33 (1982).
16 666 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
1- 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1982).
1 666 F. Supp. 1040, 1043 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
167 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987) (the Hawaii Dep't of Transp. was immune from
suit under section one of the Sherman Act for granting an exclusive contract for
taxi service from the Honolulu International Airport).
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
169 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987).
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B. Living With Atascadero
There are three possible solutions to the problems Atascadero poses.
First, Congress can enact statutes expressly abrogating a state's eleventh
amendment immunity. Congress has already done this under the civil
rights acts and under CERCLA and is likely to do so in other areas. This
is not the best solution. Abrogation legislation is reactive. It is likely to
be proposed only after case law establishes eleventh amendment im-
munity and there is a sufficient catalyst for action. Plaintiffs, in the
meantime, will be denied their rights against a state even though the
legislative history may indicate that Congress intended a different result.
There is also the question of congressional power to abrogate a state's
eleventh amendment immunity except under the fourteenth amendment.
A better solution is for the Courts to narrowly interpret Atascadero.
So far most courts which have examined Atascadero have interpreted it
as setting a new and higher standard than that in Pennhurst.170 Such an
interpretation is unwarranted. A strong case can be made that Justice
Powell did not intend such a result. In the language of the case, Justice
Powell acknowledges the fact that an intent to abrogate has not been
established under the Pennhurst standard. Justice Powell states: "To
reach respondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the requirements,
well established in our cases, [citing Pennhurst] that Congress unequi-
vocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar
to suits against the States in federal court."'171 In the next sentence he
affirms Pennhurst yet appears to set a higher standard by requiring that
the intent be in the language of the statute. Justice Powell states: "We
decline to do so, and affirm that Congress may abrogate the States' con-
stitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making
its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.'
172
Since Pennhurst did not require that an intent to abrogate be found in
the language of the statute, lower courts may be interpreting Atascadero
too broadly. There are several reasons to support a narrow interpretation
of Atascadero. First of all, this broad interpretation negates federal court
jurisdiction except when it is expressly set forth in the statute. This
appears to be the case even though there may be overwhelming evidence
that Congress intended to include the states.173 Applying this standard
to statutes enacted before Atascadero thwarts congressional intent in-
stead of following it. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently
adopted this narrow interpretation in In re McVey Trucking.174
The best solution is for the Court to overturn Atascadero. Under the
current interpretation of the eleventh amendment the Court has estab-
lished a higher standard for abrogation than for a waiver, in that a waiver
does not have to be found in the language of the statute itself.1 75 Logic
170 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
171 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
172 Id.
171 See, e.g., United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986).
7, 812 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1987).
'71 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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would indicate that the opposite should be true. Requiring "expressed
language" or "overwhelming implication" before a waiver will be found
may be appropriate since a waiver requires voluntary action on the part
of the state. But, when congressional action is based on its plenary powers,
a state's waiving of its eleventh amendment protection is not a require-
ment. In these cases the Court should seek to determine congressional
intent by applying standard rules of construction.
V. AVOIDING SUING A STATE IN FEDERAL COURT
Given the uncertainty surrounding the eleventh amendment, an at-
torney, except in cases where there has been a clear waiver or an abro-
gation of the state's immunity, would best serve his client's interest by
avoiding suing a state in federal court. Not only are the uncertainties
surrounding the constitutional issues avoided, but the remedies available
in other tribunals are generally superior to those in federal court. There
is also the problem of joining both federal and state claims in federal
court that is not faced in other tribunals. This section will first examine
the limitation on federal remedies and the problems of joining state and
federal remedies in federal court. It will be followed by an analysis of
ways of avoiding the eleventh amendment bar.
A. Limitation on Federal Remedies/The Prospective
Relief Requirement
Suing a state official rather than the state for equitable relief has
traditionally been an effective means of avoiding the eleventh amend-
ment bar. In 1908, in Ex parte Young, 176 the Court held that a suit against
a state official to enjoin him from violating a federal law was not a suit
against the state and as such not barred by the eleventh amendment.
Young has been interpreted as allowing the federal courts to order states
to pay retroactive benefits, from federally funded programs, which had
been wrongfully withheld. 177 This interpretation created a convenient
209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under
such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or repre-
sentative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him
any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the
United States.
Ex parte Young is perhaps the most noteworthy interpretation of the eleventh
amendment. Exparte Young created a convenient fiction by suing the state official
rather than the state. The federal courts under their equitable powers could reach
a result which would otherwise be unconstitutional. For a discussion of the use
of the Young principle, see Lichtenstein, supra note 3, at 366.
17' State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972),
affg, 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Sterrett v. Mothers' and Children's Rights
Organization, 409 U.S. 809 (1972), aff'g, unreported order and judgment of District
Court (N.D. Ind. 1972) on remand from Carpenter v. Sterrett, 405 U.S. 971 (1972);
Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (order at CCH Poverty Law
Rep 10,506 [1968-1971 Transfer Binder]), affd per curiam sub nom. Wyman v.
Bowen, 397 U.S. 49 (1970).
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fiction, instead of suing the state for monetary damages, which would be
barred by the amendment, one could accomplish the same objective by
suing the state official in federal court for equitable relief. The Court
ended this practice in 1974 in Edelman. 78 The Court, in Edelman, held
that the eleventh amendment bars federal courts from ordering states to
pay retroactive benefits. Under Edelman, if the plaintiff is "seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury [such suit] is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ' 179 Edelman
was following by Green v. Mansour'80 in which the Court held that a state
could change its law to comply with federal law and thus bar federal
court jurisdiction, since the need for prospective injunctive relief would
be moot.
Edelman and Green create two very effective defenses for states. If
there has not been a waiver or abrogation, the federal courts are prohib-
ited from awarding monetary damages against the states and the states
have the power to have the case dismissed as moot by a subsequent change
in the law.
-'7 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In Edelman the respondent, John Jordan, filed suit
individually and as a representative of a class, against two former directors of
the Illinois Department of Public Aid and the comptroller of Cook County. Health,
education, and welfare regulations required the state to determine eligibilitv for
aid to the disabled within forty-five days of the receipt of the application. The
respondent's application for benefits was not acted upon for almost four months.
Jordan requested "a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to
the entire class of plaintiffs all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld." The Court
held by a five-four decision that eleventh amendment barred such a suit. Id.
Justice Rehnquist, in writing for the majority, distinguished Edelman from Ex
parte Young. In Ex parte Young only prospective relief was requested; whereas,
in this case prospective relief was being requested, which was in effect an award
of damages. Justice Rehnquist stated:
We do not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court
to indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state
officer, no matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money
judgment payable out to the state treasury, so long as the relief may
be labeled "equitable" in nature.
Precedent for this distinction was quite sparse. Justice Rehnquist found support
in two cases decided before Ex parte Young, which denied specific performance of
a contract to which the state was a party. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood
v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886).
However, Edelman was in conflict with more recent cases. The Court had earlier
summarily affirmed three district court judgments requiring state directors of
public aid to make retroactive active payments similar to those in Edelman. See
supra note 178. Justice Rehnquist dismissed the precedential value of these cases
since they were not orally argued. Stronger precedent was found in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, the Court held that welfare benefits
were unlawfully withheld and affirmed the order of retroactive payments. The
Court, in Shapiro, did hear oral arguments that retroactive relief was barred by
the eleventh amendment. The case turned on the eleventh amendment since the
decision could have not been reached if the eleventh amendment barred the suit
by the court. In Justice Rehnquist's view, Shapiro did not establish a precedent
since it did not address the eleventh amendment issue.
179 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
"o474 U.S. 64 (1985).
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B. Pendent Jurisdiction in Federal Courts/The Pennhurst Doctrine
Suing a state in federal court under a pendent state claim presents
needless complications and should be avoided. The Court held in Pen-
nhurst, 81 that unless the state had expressly waived its eleventh amend-
ment immunity, federal courts are barred from hearing state law claims
brought in federal court under pendent jurisdiction. Under Pennhurst, if
the federal statute has granted the state court concurrent jurisdiction,
the state court may hear both state and federal claims. However, the
federal court would be limited to only hearing the federal claim.
Due to the limited remedies available in federal court and the bar on
federal courts hearing claims based on state law, the plaintiff, in most
cases, is better off pursuing his claim against the state in state court.
C. Methods of Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment/Suing a
State in State Court
Since the amendment does not prohibit a state from being sued in state
court, one should explore the remedies available in state court. If the
statute in question does not grant the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction,
a suit in state court for violation of a federal law may be a better alter-
native than suing in federal court. Even if the federal courts have exclu-
sive subject matterjurisdiction, if there has not been a federal preemption,
suing the state in state court based on a right created by state law is
usually preferable because of the superior remedies available in state
court.
D. Methods of Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment/Designating
the Proper Defendant
Eleventh amendment problems may also be avoided by properly des-
ignating the defendant. The amendment does not protect local govern-
ment entities. 8 2 If an adequate remedy can be obtained from a local
government, without joining the state as a party defendant, this would
be preferable in that eleventh amendment problems are avoided. If the
relief, however, is partial, or if the claim is based on a program substan-
tially funded by the state, under Pennhurst, the eleventh amendment
would bar the action.18
181465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Kennecott Cooper Corp. v.
Utah Tax Comm., 327 U.S. 573 (1946).
183465 U.S. 89, 123 (1984).
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Suing a state official rather than the state is not an effective way to
avoid the eleventh amendment bar. The Court, as early as 1824, in Osborn
v. Bank of the United States,8 4 held that the eleventh amendment did not
bar a state official from being sued in federal court for violating a federal
law. On numerous occasions, the Court has held that the eleventh amend-
ment would bar a suit in federal court against a state official if the state
was in fact the real party in interest. 85 But, the Court's interpretation
of this requirement has been both sporadic and inconsistent. 186 Edelman
signaled the Court's renewed emphasis on the real party in interest re-
quirement. Justice Rehnquist cited with approval Ford Motor Co. v. De-
partment of Treasury,8 7 in which the Court held: "When the action is in
essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real
and substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign
immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defend-
ants."s8
Even in cases which are not barred by the eleventh amendment, the
Court requires the public official rather than the state to be named as
the defendant. 18
VI. CONCLUSION
With the revitalization of the eleventh amendment following Edelman
v. Jordan, the Court began expanding the limits of the amendment's bar.
While vague notions of federalism have often been invoked to provide
support for the Court's interpretation, closer analysis, in the light of the
history and purpose of the amendment, suggests that the Court has un-
duly restricted the power of federal courts. Limiting the federal courts to
granting prospective injunctive relief and denying federal courts juris-
diction over pendent state claims results in duplication of suits, incon-
venience, and unfairness to the litigants.
The author urges the Supreme Court to reexamine the line of cases
which hold that the federal courts will not have jurisdiction over the
states unless congressional intention is "unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute." Such a requirement may be appropriate when
federal jurisdiction is based on states' waiver of their eleventh amendment
immunity as a condition of participating in a federally funded program,
but when congressional action is based on its plenary powers, waiver is
'8 9 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
185 See C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at 111-49, 156.
116 See C. JACOBS, supra note 28, at 156-60. See also Carrow, Sovereign Im-
munity in Administrative Law, 9 J. ADMIN. L. 1-2 (1960).
187 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
... 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
189 Alabama v. Pugh, 43 U.S. 781 (1978) (a suit against the state by inmates
of the Alabama prison system under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to
the U.S. Constitution was barred by the eleventh amendment since the state was
named as the defendant).
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not a requirement. In these cases, the Court should apply standard rules
of construction to determine congressional intent, but not require that
this intent be "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Since
most of the statutes in question were enacted prior to Atascadero, this
standard appears to thwart, not follow, congressional intent.
The author believes that the standard set forth in Pennhurst is the
appropriate one to determine congressional intent. Requiring "an une-
quivocal expression of congressional intent" to find an abrogation would
protect the states from federal courts assuming jurisdiction when not
clearly specified by Congress, but would not be as restrictive as Atascad-
ero. Until the Court reexamines Atascadero, the author urges federal
courts to adopt a narrow interpretation of Atascadero, as was done by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McVey.
Until the Supreme Court reexamines the line of cases limiting federal
court jurisdiction, the author strongly urges attorneys, except in cases
where there is a clear abrogation or waiver, to explore other alternative
to suing a state in federal court.
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